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Trademarks and Geographical
Indications: Exploring the Contours

of the TRIPS Agreement
Paul J. Heald*
ABSTRACT
Professor Healdfocuses upon the trademark provisions
of TRIPS, which have received less attention than the patent
and copyright provisions. He closely examines TRIPS'
substantive trademark provisions, including the definition of
trademark, eligibility for registration, rights of registrants,
and assignments/licensing. Professor Heald then considers
geographical indications of products' origins, particularly the
unique issues raised by the wine and spirits industry. He
also discusses enforcement issues, absence of use
requirements, dispute resolution, and the U.S. domestic
implementing legislation before closing with a general
assessment of the pluses and minuses TRIPS offers in the
areaof trademarkprotection.
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Although none of the many recent articles' addressing the
implications of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement or Agreement) 2 have

1.
See, e.g., J. H. Reichman. Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L
LAw. 345, 361-65 (1995); Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global
Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements, 29 INT'L LAW. 99 (1995); Marco
Intellectual Property Protection In
C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS:
Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1265-69 (1994); Ralph
Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 18
(1994); John F. Sweeney et al., Using U.S. Courts and International Treaties to
Protect Against Infringement Abroad, and at Home, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT 9, 85-88 (1994); Bruce W. Schwab, The New Era in Trademark Treaties
and Multinational Agreements, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 169, 169-78
(1994); Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
121, 127-29 (1994); James L. Bikoff & David I. Wilson, Multilateralization of
Intellectual Property Protection Under the NAFTA and the TRIPS and the Future of
U.S. BilateralIntellectual Property Initiatives, 7 INT'L Q. 1, 9-11 (1994); Jeffrey M.
Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The ChangingLandscape of InternationalTrademark
Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433, 435-37 (1993-94); Daniel R.
Bereskin, A Comparison of the Trademark Provisions of NAFTA and TRIPS, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1993); Eleanor K. Meltzer, TRIPS and Trademarks, or-GATT
Got Your Tongue?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 18 (1993).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
2.
Annex IC; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS], reprintedin THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 6-19, 365-403 (GATT
Secretariat ed., 1994). The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the TRIPS Agreement, and the rest of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), was approved by Congress on December 8, 1994. See Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465. 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).

19961

TRADEMARK AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

completely ignored Sections 2 and 3 dealing with trademarks and
geographical indications,3 one gets the feeling from these articles
that the patent and copyright sections 4 must have greater "sex
appeal" than the trademark sections. Perhaps the travails of
authors and inventors are intrinsically more interesting than the
struggles of businesses trying to identify their goods in the
market. Or maybe commentators assume that the consumer
protection aspects of trademark law provide incentives for every
government, regardless of the health of its economy, to provide at
least a minimum of protection even in the absence of
international pressure. Nonetheless, the trademark sections of
the TRIPS Agreement merit more careful scrutiny than they have
received thus far.
Although close examination reveals that TRIPS' effect on the
United States internal regulation of trademarks should not be
substantial, the agreement does bear the stamp of the French
wine industry's push for enhanced protection of geographical
indications. This may generate some interesting conflicts between
U.S. and European interests. In addition, examination of recent
U.S. legislation implementing the TRIPS Agreement exposes
several defects that may be cause for concern.
In general,
however, the most substantial changes in trademark protection
will occur outside the United States, brought about by augmented
substantive standards and vastly improved enforcement
procedures. The TRIPS trademark sections could go further to
ensure the free flow of goods and services, but, overall, U.S.
businesses and consumers should be pleased.

I. A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE TRADEMARK SECTIONS OF THE
TRIPS

AGREEMENT

Understanding the effect of the TRIPS Agreement on
international and domestic trademark law requires an
examination of the general principles for the protection of
intellectual property found in Part I of the Agreement, the
minimum substantive standards for trademarks and geographical
indications found in Sections 2 and 3 of Part II of the Agreement,

3.
The TRIPS Agreement does not use the term "appellations of origin,"
which was used in prior international agreements. For all practical purposes, the
older term can be used interchangeably with "geographical indications." Compare
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (defining "geographical indication"), with G.H.C.
BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 22 (1968) (defining "appellation of origin").

4.

See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 9-14 (Copyrights), 27-32 (Patents).
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the critical enforcement provisions found in Part III, and recent
Lanham Act s amendments.
A. General Provisions
Part I of the TRIPS Agreement requires members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt the minimum standards of
protection 6 detailed in the Paris Convention and Part II of the
It also allows member states to implement
Agreement. 7
trademark protection beyond the minimum standards, 8 but
requires that each member state must extend the same
augmented rights to non-nationals of other member states as to
its nationals. 9
This most-favored-nation provision not only
prevents a member from preferring its own citizens over nonnationals from other member states but also generally prohibits
discrimination between nationals of different member states. 1 0
Therefore, with some exceptions, any advantage granted "by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
Members.""
Interestingly, Part I carefully sidesteps issues raised by gray
market imports 12 (or the first sale doctrine), stating that "nothing
in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights."' 3 Presumably, the

TRIPS Agreement does not require a member to reject or accept
the importation of legitimately trademarked goods that are
intended to be sold without the permission of the trademark's
local owner.
Whether this stance is consistent with the
agreement's stated goal to advance "the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of

5.
The Lanham Act provides for the registration and protection of
trademarks used in interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)
(establishing substantive requirements for registration and providing federal
causes of action for the infringement of registered and unregistered marks).
See TRIPS, supranote 2. art. 1.
6.
7.
Id. art. 2. See also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883. as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Relchman, supra note 1, at 347.
8.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1.
9.
Id. art. 3 (subject to any exceptions contained in the Paris Convention).
See also Cordray. supra note 1, at 125. The Lanham Act already provides this
protection in the United States for foreign nationals. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b)
(1994).
See TRIPS. supra note 2, art. 4 (excepting some international
10.
agreements).
11.
Id.
12.
See Bronckers, supra note 1. at 1265-69.
13.
TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 6.
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producers and users . . . in a manner conducive to social and
14
economic welfare" is highly debatable and will be explored infra.

B. Substantive TrademarkProtection: TRIPS, the ParisConvention,
and the Lanham Act

The incorporation of Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention into the TRIPS Agreement 15 complicates the task of
delineating the new scope of protection and makes it necessary to
discuss both treaties simultaneously.
1. Definition of "Trademark"
Unlike the Paris Convention, Article 15(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement begins its trademark provisions with a broad definition
of "protectable subject matter" that includes "[a]ny sign . .
capable of distinguishing... goods or services of one undertaking
from those of other undertakings .... -16 The definition of "signs"
includes not only word marks but also "personal names, letters,
numerals, figurative elements, and combinations of colors."17 The
requirement that a mark be "capable of distinguishing" goods
clearly excludes generic "marks" from the definition.
Unfortunately for those seeking protection for their trade dress,
Article 15 does not include product shape or packaging in its
definition, 18 although some protection may be available through
the incorporation of the unfair competition principles of the Paris
Convention. 19

2. Eligibility for Registration
Article 15 also makes "signs," as therein defined, prima facie
Member states may,
eligible for trademark registration. 20
however, condition registration of descriptive marks 2 1 upon proof

14.
See Infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art 2(1).
15.
16.
Id. art. 15(1). See Meltzer, supra note 1. at 24-25.
17.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(1).
See Bikoff & Wilson, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that NAFTA, North
18.
America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993). art. 1708(1), does include product shape and packaging in its
definition of trademark).
19.
See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 10bis(3)(1) (prohibiting the
creation of "confusion by any means whatever with . . . the goods . . . of a

competitor").
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(1).
20.
See id. ("[Wlhere signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the
21.
relevant goods and services....").
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of secondary meaning, 2 2 and they may require that a mark be
"visually perceptible." 23 Article 15 also requires other factors
relevant under the Paris Convention to be considered in the
decision to register. 24 Therefore, registration of certain flags and
emblems is prohibited, 25 and member states may deny
registration to deceptive marks, 26 to those confusingly similar to
marks already properly registered by another, 27 and to those that
"designate the kind, quality, intended purpose, value, [and] place
of origin of the goods." 2 8 A member state may also provide that a
trademark will be canceled or registration denied on the grounds
of abandonment, defined as "an uninterrupted period of at least
three years of non-use." 2 9
No Lanham Act registration
requirement or prohibition 0 seems to conflict with these
provisions, with the possible exception of its abandonment
provision, 3 ' which permits immediate cancellation upon proof of
the owner's intent to abandon its mark.
The term of registration required by member states must be
at least seven years, renewable indefinitely.3 2 Member states may
condition registration or renewal on actual use of the mark in
commerce; use may not be required at the time of application.3 3
An applicant must be given at least three years to make any
required use of the mark before the application can be rejected for
non-use. 3 4 Currently, the Lanham Act requires an applicant to
verify its use of the trademark in commerce within six months of
filing.3 5 A six-month extension is available to an applicant as a
matter of right, but further extensions are only available for cause

22.
See id. (Member states may require "distinctiveness acquired through
use.").
23.
Id. The Lanham Act contains no such requirement. See Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1300, 1307 (1995) (suggesting that scents and
sounds may be registered).
24.

See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 15(2).

25.
See Paris Convention, supra note 7. art. 6ter.
26.
See Id. art. 6qulnqules(B)(3).
27.
See Id. arts. 6qulnqules(B)(3), 10bls(3).
28.
Id. art. 6qulnqules(B)(2).
29.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 19(1).
30.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (denying registration to (a) immoral or
scandalous marks; (b) flags or coats of arms; (c) the names of living individuals
without their permission; (d) marks confusingly similar to those already properly
registered; or (e) marks that are deceptively misdescriptive, primarily
geographically descriptive, primarily geographically misdescriptive. or primarily
merely surnames).
31.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
32.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1994) (providing for a ten-year term,
renewable indefinitely) with TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 18.
33.
TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 15(3).
34.
Id.
35.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (1994).
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and may not aggregate more than twenty-four months.3 6 This
falls short of the three-year grace period required by the TRIPS
Agreement, and recent legislation 3 7 implementing TRIPS did not
contain the necessary amendment.
The final two sections of Article 15 are quite consistent with,
although not identical to, U.S. domestic law. They provide that
the nature of trademarked goods is irrelevant to registration3 8 and
require trademarks to be published either before registration or
shortly thereafter. 39 All members must afford a "reasonable
but need not allow
opportunity for petitions to cancel,"
40
preregistration opposition proceedings.
3. Rights of Registrants
Article 16 grants the owner of a registered mark the right to
prevent confusing uses of an identical or similar mark on
identical or similar goods. 4 1 As under U.S. law, a presumption of

confusion arises when identical marks are used on identical
goods. 4 2 Unlike under the Paris Convention, however, TRIPS
service marks receive protection equal to that of marks affixed to
43
goods or trade names.
Owners of "well-known" marks obtain additional protection
44
against certain uses of their marks on dissimilar goods.
Unfortunately, "well-known" is defined in neither the TRIPS
Agreement nor the Paris Convention. Although TRIPS provides

36.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (1994).
37.
See S. 2368, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
38.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(4). But see In re Mavety Media Group,
Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing registrability of "Black Tail" for
adult magazine). The nature of the goods to which the trademark is applied is
relevant to the issue of registration. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
would find nothing scandalous about "Black Tail" as the trademark for a
magazine for the formal wear industry. As a trademark for a magazine featuring
photos of African-American women, however, the PTO denied registration. See Id.
(remanding for further consideration).
39.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(5). The Lanham Act requires
publication before registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1994).
40.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1995) (opposition proceedings may be brought
within 30 days of publication by any party potentially damaged by the
registration).
41.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16(1).
42.
See Crown Indust. Prod. Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 440
F.2d 446, 448 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
43.
See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 16(2). But see Paris Convention, supra
note 7. art. 6sextes (protection of service marks not required by registration of
marks).
44.
See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 15(2) (incorporating Paris Convention,
supra note 7, art. 6bis (protecting unregistered "well-known" trademarks from
unauthorized confusing uses on identical or similar goods)).
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that "the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the
public, including knowledge in that member obtained as a result
of the promotion of the trademark 4 5 shall be taken into account,
no further guidance is given. Prior discussion and litigation of the
definition of well-known 46 merely emphasizes the uncertain
protection of marks when used on unrelated goods. Under the
Lanham Act, 4 7 a trademark owner is protected from confusing
uses of its mark on dissimilar goods irrespective of the relative
48
fame of the mark.
TRIPS protection of well-known marks against uses on
dissimilar goods appears limited to situations involving what the
Lanham Act describes as "confusion... as to... sponsorship. '49
In a false sponsorship case, the trademark owner must prove that
consumers are likely to believe that the infringing goods are
authorized, licensed, or officially approved by the trademark
owner. 50
This differs from state law causes of action for
trademark dilution, which do not require confusion or mistaken
belief, 5 1 but purport to provide a remedy for the "tarnishment" or
"dilution" of the trademark's intrinsic value. 5 2 Article 16 of TRIPS

requires that a dissimilar use "indicate a connection between [the
infringing] goods or services and the owner of the registered
trademark."5 3

The requirement

of a

mistaken belief in a

45.

See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16(2).

46.

See 2 STEPHEN LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,

AND RELATED RIGHTS:

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION § 681 at 1253-54 (1975) ("The meaning of
'well-known' (notolrement connue) is rather elusive. Certainly, it means something
more than merely 'known.' ").
47.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1995) (any false designation of origin likely to
cause confusion is actionable).
48.
See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d
Cir. 1979) (setting out eight-factor test to determine infringement in cases
involving non-competing goods). The fame of a mark, however, is a component in
the test used to judge likelihood of confusion.
49.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1995).
50.
See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no confusion as to sponsorship caused by
independent jewelers placement of fraternal emblem on rings).
51.
See, for example, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw. § 368-d (1988). which states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief...
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
52.
See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875
F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (defining dilution "as either the blurring of a mark's
product identification or the tamishment of the affirmative associations a mark
has come to convey"). Junior uses may blur a mark's product Identification or
they may tarnish the affirmative associations a mark has come to convey. Id. at
1034 (Sweet, J., concurring).
53.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16(3).
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"connection between those goods" seems much closer to the
traditional Lanham Act false 5 sponsorship
cause of action than to
4
a cause of action for dilution.
Several important exceptions limit the rights granted to
trademark owners in Article 16. A member state may permit a
fair use of a mark that consists of descriptive terms.5 5 And,
descriptive marks that have not acquired "distinctiveness"
through use need not be protected at all.56
Other limitations apply through the incorporation of the Paris
Convention. For example, a registered trademark can be subject
to preexisting rights established by another entity in the country
in which protection is claimed. 5 7 This is consistent with the
Lanham Act provision that if a business has used a mark in good
faith in the United States, then the rights acquired by a
subsequent registration of the mark by another entity are subject
to the prior use.5 8 This result is permitted by the TRIPS
Agreement but not dictated by it-a member state may establish a
strict first-to-file system.
Member states may also deny
registration to a mark that is "of such a nature as to deceive the
public."

59

4. Assignments and Licensing
Unlike the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act, the TRIPS
Agreement unequivocally grants trademark owners the right to
assign their trademarks "with or without the transfer of the
business to which the trademark belongs."60 In some cases,
Article 21 could be interpreted to allow the assignment of a
trademark without its attendant goodwill; under the Lanham Act

54.
For further discussion of whether Article 16 of TRIPS requires
Congress to enact a federal dilution statute, see Infra notes 133-40.
55.
See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 17. Cf. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) (trademark use of "fish fry" not
Infringement, even though the owner of "Fish Fri" mark proved secondary
meaning in the relevant market).
56.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(1). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1995)
(providing for registration of descriptive marks that have "become distinctive of
the applicant's goods in commerce").
57.
See Paris Convention, supra note 7. art. 6qulnqules(B)(1).
58.
See Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968)
(allowing user of unregistered mark "Burger King" to prevail over owner of
federally registered mark "Burger King" in limited geographic area).

59.
Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6qulnquies(B)(3). Cf. Id. art.
10bis(3)(3) (misleading public in the course of trade constitutes unfair
competition).
60.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 21. But see Paris Convention, supra note 7.
art. 6quater(1) (requiring "transfer of the business or goodwill to which the mark
belongs").
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and at common law, this transaction would result in the
abandonment of the mark.6 ' For example, the owner of the mark
"Mondo-Choc Cookies" might sell its 'mark without transferring
the cookie recipe (a trade secret), the unique machines necessary
to make the cookies, or any other of its assets (i.e., all the things
that constitute the owner's "business"). In this scenario, the
goodwill attendant to the trademark has not been transferred by
the owner; the assignment of the mark, therefore, is void as
against public policy and the mark is abandoned.6 2 Article 21 of
the TRIPS Agreement may suggest a different result.6 3 Congress
the Lanham Act to provide for such
has not amended
64
assignments.
Finally, the TRIPS Agreement prohibits compulsory licensing
of trademarks,6 5 something that has never been allowed under
U.S. domestic law,6 6 but which was permissible under the Paris
Convention.6 7 Members are also prohibited from requiring a
foreign trademark to be tied to a domestic mark in order to be
registered. 6 8
C. Substantive Levels of Protectionfor GeographicalIndications
In the TRIPS Agreement, protection for geographical
indications of goods are provided separately from trademark
protection.6 9 Pressure from certain member states, especially
France,7 0 resulted in a different set of rules to protect products
that are inextricably linked to a particular locale.

61.
See Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838,
842 (9th Cir. 1969).
62.
See Id.
63.
One could argue, however, that Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement only
negates the Paris Convention requirement of the transfer of "the business,"
leaving intact the disjunctive requirement of the transfer of "the goodwill." See
Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6quater(1). This interpretation would strongly
reinforce the prior clear need to assign the goodwill along with the trademark.
Apparently the U.S. representative saw no need for an amendment.
64.
See Schwab. supra note 1, at 176.
See TRIPS, supra note 2,art. 21.
65.
See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698,
66.
704 (7th Cir. 1984) (calling the notion of compulsory licensing "absurd").
See Paris Convention, supra note 7. art. 5(c). See also Reichman,
67.
supra note 1, at 361.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 20. See Cordray, supra note 1, at 128
68.
(noting India's former practice).
See Reichman, supra note 1, at 363-64.
69.
See Cordray. supra note 1, at 131 n.62.
70.
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1. Definition
A "geographical indication" identifies goods that originate
from a particular place "where a given quality, reputation, or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin." 7 1
Examples include "Calvados"7 2 apple
brandy, "Vidalia" onions, and "Roquefort" 73 dressing, but not
"Vienna"74 sausages, eau de "Cologne," 75 "New York" cheesecake,
76
or "Dijon" mustard.
2. Remedies
Member states are required to provide the mechanisms that
enable interested parties to prevent untruthful and misleading
uses of geographical indications. 7 7 In other words, onion growers
in Arkansas may not call their onions "Vidalia," even if they are
genetically identical to onions grown in Vidalia, Georgia.
In
addition, literal truth is not a defense if the use of the

geographical indication misleads the public.7 8 Therefore, onion
growers in Vidalia, Vermont, may not market their onions as
"Vidalla" onions.
Member states whose legislation would
otherwise permit this use must refuse to register or cancel
registrations of misleading geographical indications.
None of
79
these provisions creates any conflict within U.S. trademark law.

71.
TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 22(1).
72.
Cf. 3 LADAS, supra note 46, § 865 at 1611 (noting an exchange of
letters between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to
France, through which the parties agreed, apparently on behalf of their
governments, that "Calvados" would be protected as a geographical indication in
the United States and "Bourbon" would be protected as a geographical indication
in France).
73.
See Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494
(2d Cir. 1962) ("Roquefort" was protected as a collective mark owned by
cheesemakers in and around Roquefort, France.).
74.
Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Protection of Indicationsof GeographicalOrigin
In the Federal Republic of Germany in PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHIC DENOMINATIONS
OF GOODS AND SERVICES 21 (Herman Cohen Jehoram ed., 1980) [hereinafter
PROTECTION OF DENOMINATIONS) ("Vienna sausages" is a generic term.).
75.
See 3 LADAS, supra note 46, § 842 at 1575 (suggesting "eau de
Cologne" is generic).
76.
See id. (suggesting "Dijon mustard" is generic).
77.
See Cordray, supranote 1, at 128-29.
78.
See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 22(4).
79.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 1054 (1995). See also In re Loews Theatres,
Inc., 769 F.2d 764. 767 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (denying registration to "Durango" for
chewing tobacco as "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"); In re

Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re House of Windsor, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
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3. Special Provisions for Wines and Spirits
Articles 23 and 24 provide broader protection for geographical
indications for wines and spirits than for other products. An
interested party need not prove that the public has been misled
by the use of the indication in order to obtain relief. Even if the
public is not misled by an advertisement for "St. Emilion-style
Bourdeaux," "imitation Calvados," or "Nuits St. Georges quality
wine," such a use violates Article 23.80 A grandfather clause,
however, permits continuing uses of indications initiated more
than ten years preceding the end of the Uruguay Round or any
good faith use initiated before that date.8 ' In addition, until a
geographical indication is protected in its country of origin, rights
acquired in good faith through use or registration of a trademark
82
incorporating the indication are immune from attack.
On their face, Articles 23 and 24 should not upset the
commercial expectations of U.S. vintners and wine merchants.
Although the requirement of consumer deception or confusion is
omitted, Article 23 protects only "geographical indications," a
defined term that includes only words that "identify a good as
originating in the territory of a Member... where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographic origin."8 3 Within the borders of the
United States, this definition would appear to exclude terms such
as "champagne," which has ceased to describe a product that only
originates in the former French province of the same name,8 4 or
"chablis," which similarly indicates a variety of wine rather than a

80.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art 23(1) (prohibiting geographical indications
on "wines not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication...
even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical Indication
is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as 'kind,' 'type,' 'style,'

"imitation,' or the like").
81.
See Id. art. 24(4).
82.
Id. art. 24(5).
83.
Id. art. 22(1).
84.
See Robin Jacob, The Protection of GeographicalIndications of Origin In
the United Kingdom, in PROTECTION OF DENOMINATIONS, supra note 74, at 135, 139
(Champagne "probably means no more than [sparkling wine] in the [United
States] now."). Cf. 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(b)(2) (1995) (declaring "champagne" to be
"semi-generic" and available for use on wines originating outside of Champagne,
France, as long as the true geographical origin of the wine is indicated on the
product). See Council Regulation 823/87 of Mar. 16, 1987, art. 15(2)(b), 1987
O.J. (L84) 59, 65 (providing for the protection of Champagne indication

throughout the European Community). See also Jacob, supra, at 138-39 (noting

that champagne was protected in England before the EC agreement of geographic
indications for wines); Beier, supra note 74, at 33-34 (same in Germany).
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beverage that comes primarily from a particular location.
Presumably, similar, predominately generic uses of such terms in
other countries would result in their unprotected status there. 8 6
To emphasize the lack of protection for generic geographic
indications, Article 24 expressly preserves the right to use
geographical indications that are "identical with the term
customary in common language as the common name for such
goods." 8 7 "Burgundy," "rhine," and "chablis" for wine would seem
to fall into this category within the borders of the United States,
as certainly would "champagne."8 8 Although the French have

worked hard to deter the generic use of "champagne" on naturally
carbonated, sparkling, white wine beverages that do not originate
in the region surrounding Rheims, France, they have failed in the
United States to influence the "common language" in which
"champagne" is the "common name" for sparkling wine rather
than a source indicator. Imprecise U.S. nationals 8 9 routinely and
virtually universally refer to Freixnet (from Spain), Korbel (from
California), Tott's (from California), and similar products as
"champagne."90 Arguments against protection would not apply,
however, in countries where consumers expect that all
"burgundy" and "champagne" come from France.

See Institut National des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co.,
85.
958 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Being generic and, therefore, in the public
domain, 'Chablis' does not function as a trademark to indicate origin."); cf. 27
C.F.R. § 4.24(b)(2) (1995) (declaring "chablis" to be "semi-generic" and available

for use on wines originating outside of Chablis, France, as long as the true
geographical origin of the wine is indicated on the product). See Council
Regulation 823/87 of Mar. 16, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L84) 59, 65 (providing for the
protection of geographic indications for wine; "Chablis" is protected under
II.A.2.3. 1. on list contained in the regulation).
86.
See Beier, supra note 74, at 34 (stating that "Pilsner" is generic in
Germany). But see Francois Dessemontet, Protection of GeographicDenominations
Under Swiss Law, In PROTECTION OF DENOMINATIONS, supra note 74. at 110
("Pilsner" remains a protected geographic indication under Swiss law.). Cf. L.
Hoeth, Protectionof GeographicDenominationsin the Netherlands, In PROTECTION OF
DENOMINATIONS, supra note 74, at 81 ("Cologne" is generic in the Netherlands).
See 2 LADAS, supra note 46, § 851 at 1590 (In decisions rendered before EC
regulations were implemented, "Camembert" was held to be generic in France,

but not in Germany; "Vichy" was held to be generic in Italy, but not in France;
"Munich" was held to be generic in Belgium, but not in Germany.).
87.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24(6).
88.
See 27 C.F.R. § 4.21(b)(2) (1995) (defining "Champagne" as "a type of
sparkling light wine"). At least one commentator disagrees without explanation.
See Oman, supra note 1.at 30 (The uses of" 'champagne-style' sparkling wine or
"). Cf. Bereskin, supra note 1, at 12.
'California Port' are no longer permittes ....
89.
As a former resident of Spain, the author can witness to similar generic
uses of the term there.
90.
See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 32 n.70 (noting the U.S. "tendency to use
geographic names as the generic names of goods").
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In spite of the express language of Articles 24 and 25, the
United States can expect the European Community (EC) to be
very aggressive in seeking to monopolize valuable terms. EC
regulations protect many words 91 even though they may be
generic within the borders of some of its member states. Use of
these terms for wine produced outside the indicated region is
prohibited under EC law, even if the term is generic, and even if
consumers are not confused. Similarly, at least two international
agreements, the Madrid Arrangement and the Lisbon
Arrangement on Appellations of Origin, eliminate the genericness
defense to the registered terms. 9 2 The French have worked for
almost 100 years to attain unassailable protection for terms like
"champagne" and "chablis,"9 3 and they can be expected to
challenge any argument that the TRIPS Agreement has not finally
given them the protection they have long sought.
The champagne war should eventually find its way to the
WTO for resolution.
In the absence of express protection for
generic geographic indications for wines, such as those provided
in the Madrid Arrangement, 94 the WTO is likely to rule that
generic geographic indications need not be protected by member
Nonetheless, a huge
states under the TRIPS Agreement. 95
Under what standard will questions of
question remains:
genericness be judged? Under U.S. law, the focus is squarely on
consumer perception, 9 6 and courts are frequently willing to find
Some European commentators suggest a
marks generic. 9 7
narrower objective standard, 98 and, in general, European courts

These include Pinot Noir, Champagne, Burgundy, Chablis, Hock,
91.
Sherry, Port, Claret, Cognac, Sauternes, and Chianti.
The United States has acceded to neither of these agreements. See 3
92.
LADAS, supra note 46, § 865 at 1607. The Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891. 828 U.N.T.S. 389, reprinted In
MARSHALL LEAFLER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 229 (1990):

Text of Act of Nice, Madrid Agreement, Ratified Dec. 15, 1964, 55 Trademark Rep.
(BNA) 758 (1965); Lisbon Arrangement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin
and Their International Registration, Oct. 31. 1958. reprintedin LEAFLER, supra, at

278 [hereinafter Lisbon Arrangement].
93.
See 3 LADAS, supra note 46, at 1578-1605.
See Lisbon Arrangement, supra note 92. art. 4.
Prior to the relevant EC regulations, most countries in Europe did not
protect generic geographic indications. See PROTECTION OF DENOMINATIONS, supra
94.
95.

note 74. Presumably, generic indications not registered with the EC will remain
unprotected.
96.
See A.J. Canfleld Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986)
("chocolate fudge" generic for diet sodas).
97.
See, e.g., Institut National Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Int'l
Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding "Chablis" to be generic).
98.
See Beier. supra note 74, at 27 (discussing a German case wherein the
Judge noted that "many members of the public improperly understand 'Cognac' to
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seem very hesitant to declare a geographical indication
unprotected.
In Germany, the "majority of writers have
consistently urged that one must view with suspicion the defense
that an indication of origin has been transformed into a generic
name. As long as some appreciable section of the trade regards
the description as an indication of origin, it must be protectable
as such."9 9 In Switzerland, "a geographic name must have been
used for decades to describe a material quality, and must still be
understood as such by all interested persons in order to be
deemed generic." 0 0° For the time being, member states must live
with some uncertainty over the standards that can be expected to
be applied to arguably generic geographical indications.
Given the uncertainty created by the definition of "geographic
indication" and the express exception for "common language"
terms, perhaps the best French hope for increased protection of
its products around the world lies in the issue-specific
negotiations required by Articles 23 and 24,101 and the
requirement that no member state diminish protections that
predate the establishment of the WTO.
D. Enforcement Provisions
Several commentators have noted that the enforcement
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are the most promising
sections in the Agreement.' 0 2 Under the Paris Convention, a

country was under no obligation to enact legislation permitting
10 3

Part
seizure or prohibiting importation of infringing goods.
Three of the TRIPS Agreement mandates that "Members shall
ensure that enforcement procedures . . . permit effective action
against any act of infringement . . . covered by this

be a generic term for brandy"). Neither Beier nor the court explain what standard
should be used to evaluate whether the public's perception is "proper" or not.
99.
Id. at 21.
100. See Dessemontet, supra note 86, at 110 ("With these severe standards,
it is no wonder that denominations like Pilsner and Miinchner Bier remain
geographic denominations.").
101. See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 23(4) ("[N]egotiations shall be undertaken
in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and
registration of geographical indications for wines."); Id. art. 24(1) (Members agree
to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual
geographical indications under Article 23."). See also Id. art. 24(2).
102. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 1,at 364-65.
103. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 9(6). Cf. Mladen Singer, How
Trademark Practitioners Perceive the Availability of Provisional Remedies for
Infringement: A World-Wide Survey, 36 IDEA 67 (1995) (surveying the availability
of remedies for trademark infringement in the pre-TRIPS context).
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Agreement,"10 4 including injunctive relief,' 0 5 money damages,' 0 6
and strong border control measures. I0 7 Members must also
provide for criminal prosecution-including seizure, forfeiture,
and destruction of infringing goods-in cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting. 0 8 The procedures and safeguards for stopping
infringing goods at the border are spelled out in detail and should
greatly improve a trademark owner's ability 9 to stop the flow of
0
infringing goods in international commerce.1
E. Dispute Resolution Between Members
The real genius of TRIPS lies in its provisions establishing a
system of dispute resolution between member states." 0 The
contours of the process have been described at length
elsewhere, I I but, in short, a forum now exists in which
disgruntled members can attempt to coerce other members into
compliance with the substantive provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement. The WTO was established to mediate and adjudicate
disagreements between members over interpretative and
enforcement issues. Of course, the WTO's success depends
entirely upon the willingness of its members to play within its
rules. 1 12 If adverse decisions are routinely ignored by the losing
party, then the TRIPS regime will not constitute much of an
improvement over the Paris Convention. Nonetheless, for the first
time there is real hope for multilateral enforcement of a major
international intellectual property convention.
F. Implementing Legislation in the United States
The U.S. Congress responded to the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement with two Lanham Act amendments designed to
harmonize domestic and international trademark law. Congress,

104. See TRIPS, supra note 2,art. 41(1).
105. Id. art. 44.
106. Id. art. 45.
107. Id. arts. 51-60.
108. Id. art. 61.
109. Id. arts. 51-60 (including the destruction of infringing goods), See
Bereskin, supra note 1. at 15-16.
110. See generally Geller, supra note 1.
111. Id.; Reichman, supra note 1, at 385-88; Cordray. supra note 1, at 13334; Bronckers, supra note 1, at 1274-78; Oman, supra note 1, at 27-28.
112. In particular, some worry that the United States will not be willing to
accept adverse decisions rendered by the WTO. The recently settled conflict with
Japan over auto imports demonstrates the U.S. governments continued
willingness to threaten to pursue unilateral measures.
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however, may have more work to do to bring federal law into
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
1. Geographic Indications for Wines and Spirits
In response to Articles 23 and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement,
Congress amended the Lanham Act to prohibit registration of "a
geographical indication which, when used in connection with
wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the
goods."1 13 The amendment expressly insulates marks used by an
applicant in the first year after the WTO Agreement enters into
force in the United States. 1 14 The amendment does not comply
with the TRIPS Agreement and introduces a serious element of
confusion into domestic law.
Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that member
states provide a remedy for the unauthorized use of a
geographical indication used for wines and spirits, even when the
use does not cause confusion among consumers. 1 15 Although the
revised Section 1052(a) prevents registration of unauthorized
geographical indications, nothing in the Lanham Act currently
provides any remedy for a nonconfusing use of a trademark or
geographical indication."16
The American Bar Association
supported the amendments precisely because the confusion
requirement was retained."l 7 Foreign wine merchants will be

sorely disappointed when they seek to enjoin nonconfusing uses
of their geographical indications in U.S. courts. Of course, an
infringement action to enjoin a misleading, deceptive, or
confusing use of such an indication is clearly authorized by the
Lanham Act."18
The amendment's grandfather clause is also problematic.
Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement does not restrict a merchant

113. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (Supp. 1995).
114. Id.
115. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art 23(1). See also Cordray, supra note 1, at
128-29.
116. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(b) (1995) (Action for the infringement of a
registered mark requires proof of a likelihood of consumer confusion.) and
1125(a)(1)(b) (1994) (Action for the infringement of an unregistered mark requires
proof of a likelihood of consumer confusion.).
117. See Letter from Thomas E. Smith, Chair, American Bar Association,
Section of Intellectual Property Law, to Hon. Dennis DeConcini (Sept. 15, 1994)
("In 1979 the Section went on record as opposing any prohibition on the use of
geographical indications or their registration as trademarks except where such
geographical indications would mislead the public as to the true country of origin.
We believe that these conditions are met in Section 7 of S.2368 and therefore
support this section."), reprinted In House Committee on the Judiciary Serial No.
90 (1995).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1995).
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from using a geographical indication that it has employed
continuously for at least ten years or that was adopted in good
faith before the conclusion of GATT's Uruguay Round."i 9 Instead
of adopting verbatim the TRIPS grandfather principles, the
amendment permits the registration of a mark comprising a
geographical indication that was adopted before the United States
had been a member of the WTO for one year. 120 The amendment
permits the registration of indications adopted with notice of
other's claims to the indication, and also permits some marks
that were adopted after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
French wine makers, the force behind Articles 23 and 24 of the
TRIPS Agreement, once again have good reason to be worried
about whether they have really gained any ground in protecting
their regional appellations in the United States.
One omission by the U.S. Congress, however, may work to
the benefit of the foreign wine and spirit industry. When it
prohibited the registration of unauthorized geographical
indications for wine and spirits adopted after the relevant cut-off
date, Congress failed to define "geographical indication." As noted
above, the defnition of "geographical indication" in Article 22 of
the TRIPS Agreement precludes the protection of terms that do
not "identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member...
where a given quality . .. is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin. " 12 1 Without this restrictive definition in the
Lanham Act, the argument could be made that any mark
containing a word that has a geographic connotation, such as
"Champagne"122 or "Scotch," is unregistrable or subject to
cancellation when applied to goods coming from outside the
indicated region. A court sensitive to the legislative history of the
amendments may well look to the TRIPS definition for
guidance,'2 but Congress could have avoided the possibility of
confusion by directly importing the TRIPS definition.
2. Presumption of Abandonment
Article 19 of the TRIPS Agreement states that when "use is
required to maintain a registration, the registration may be

canceled only after an uninterrupted period of at least three years

119. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24(4).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (Supp. 1995).
121. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
122.
See discussion at notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
123. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 1721. 32 I.L.M. 605, 698
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994), also defines geographical indications in much

the same way as the TRIPS Agreement.
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of non-use." 12 4 In response to Article 19, Congress raised the
presumptive period of non-use constituting abandonment from
two to three years. 12 5 This certainly moves the United States
toward TRIPS compliance, but the amendment retains an intent
element, providing that abandonment occurs when "use has been
discontinued with intent not to resume such use."12 6 Under the
Lanham Act, a trademark owner can abandon a mark at any time
simply by publicizing the abandonment 27 or otherwise
manifesting the requisite intent, 128
thereby rendering it
amenable to cancellation proceedings or adoption by another. In
other words, cancellation can theoretically be accomplished well

inside the three-year minimum set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.
Given that most cancellations for abandonment proceed under
the statutory presumption rather than after proof of intent to
abandon, this incongruence between TRIPS and U.S. federal law
may not prove particularly troublesome.
3. Other Conflicts and Omissions
In addition to the problems this Article discusses supra, at
least two other amendments may be necessary to harmonize the
Lanham Act with the TRIPS Agreement. As already noted, Article
21 grants trademark owners the right to assign a mark without
assigning "the business to which the trademark belongs."'1 2 9 To
the extent that this authorizes an assignment of a trademark
without its attendant goodwill (assuming a case where goodwill is
inextricably tied to the business) it may be at odds with U.S.
domestic law. 130 Finally, Article 15 provides that an application
to register a mark may not be refused on the grounds of non-use
until the passage of three years.' 3 1 Currently, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) can only defer the expiration of an
application for an unused mark for two years. 13 2 The TRIPS
Agreement makes it necessary to pass an amendment extending
that period to three years.

124.

TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 19.

125.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).

126.

Id.

127. See Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d
628, 629 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing General Mills' intentional abandonment
of its "Kimberly" mark on women's apparel).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) ("Intent not to resume may be inferred
from circumstances.").
129. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 21.
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
131. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 15(3).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1994).
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Although some recent commentary suggests TRIPS may
13 3 Article 16134
require the passage of a federal dilution statute,
need not be read so broadly. At least two credible arguments can
be made against the need to amend. First, Article 16 requires
that consumers perceive a "connection" between the use of the
owner's trademark and the dissimilar goods on which the
offending use has been made. Traditional dilution doctrine in the
United States does not require that consumers perceive any
"connection."1 3 5 For example, a chestnut example of the dilution
doctrine posits the prohibition of the use of "Rolls Royce" by a
peanut vendor in the Bowery.13 6 No one believes Rolls Royce
autos have any connection to peanuts; Rolls Royce merely wants
to maintain control over what is a valuable part of its industrial
property. The "connection" requirement is better understood to
establish a cause of action for false sponsorship or association,
37
remedies for which are already found in the Lanham Act.1
Second, Article 16 incorporates Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention, which prohibits reproductions, imitations, and
translations of well-known marks from uses on identical or similar
goods that are "liable to create confusion." 13 8 After stating that
Article 6bis shall apply mutatis mutandis to dissimilar goods and

services, thereby expanding the existing level of protection, Article
16 of the TRIPS Agreement adds the "connection" qualifier
discussed supra. Article 16 might plausibly be read to retain fully
the confusion element of Article 6bis,13 9 thereby requiring that
consumers be confused by the perceived connection between the
infringer's use of another's trademark.
So understood, no
amendment to the Lanham Act is necessary to create a cause of
action independent of confusion. No federal cause of action for

133.
134.

See Reichman, supranote 1,at 363.
Article 16 states:

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) [protecting well-known marks
from confusing uses on identical goods] shall apply. mutatts mutandEs, to
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a

trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to

those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods
or services and the owner of the registered trademark ....
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16(3).
135.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (1984); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW § 25 (1995).

136. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 306 (1987).
137.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
138.
Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis(1).
139.
See BODENHAUSEN, supra note 3, at 90 (Article 6bis requires proof of
confusion.).
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dilution is necessary to harmonize domestic law with the TRIPS
140
Agreement.

II. A NORMATIVE

CRITIQUE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

No international agreement can be perfect, and the TRIPS
accord is no exception. While some portions of the Agreement
deserve applause, others are less satisfying.
A. Applause
The TRIPS Agreement is good news for trademark owners
around the world. Under the Paris Convention, the substantive
levels of protection were lower, enforcement procedures were not
absolutely required, and no credible body existed to resolve intersovereign disputes.
TRIPS establishes substantive levels of
protection that are at least equal to those of the Lanham Act, and
requires adequate enforcement mechanisms to be put in place in
all member states. Best of all, the WTO monitors a dispute
resolution process, providing a forum for the sanction and
coercion of noncomplying nations.
One should not expect official noncompliance to be an
overwhelming problem.
The protection afforded trademarks
under TRIPS does not merely benefit corporations in a few
wealthy nations, but prevents marketplace confusion that is
detrimental to interests of consumers in every nation. People who
buy jeans in Brazil, Thailand, and Poland, for example, should all
benefit from increased honesty in labeling. Even a country that
exports significant amounts of counterfeit goods has incentives to
comply, given the benefit of increased protection for its own
consumers.
Unlike copyright and patent protection, which
impose high, short-term costs on consumers, trademark law
increases
consumer
wealth
by
improving
consumer
information. 14 1 The myth that trademark protection under a

140.
Ladas' discussion of failed attempts to amend the Paris Convention to
provide international antidilution protection for "marks of great reputation" (not
merely well-known marks) is quite illuminating. See 2 LADAS, supra note 46, at
1258-63. Unadopted draft agreements exhibit language that is not found in the
TRIPS Agreement. For example, one resolution adopted by the Berlin Congress
provided disjunctively that marks of "higher reputation" be protected from uses
that were likely "to mislead the public or be harmful to the proprietor of the
mark." Id. at 1262. Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement conjunctively prohibits

uses that "indicate a connection between those goods or services and the owner of
the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner ... are
likely to be damaged by such use." TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16(3).
141.

See Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 268-73.

656

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:635

confusion rationale results in higher prices (or other monopolistic
practices to the detriment of consumers) was convincingly
exploded long ago. 14 2 Of course, corruption of officials by traders
in counterfeit goods may be a problem, 143 and locales that remain
unreasonably dubious about the benefits of protection may
resist. 14 4
Finally, the increased protection of geographic
indications should provide incentives for underdeveloped member
states to develop local industries and market agricultural
45
products worldwide under an exclusive indication of source.'
B. Selected Grumblings
1. Gray Market Goods

The TRIPS Agreement specifically sidesteps the issue of the

propriety of importing gray market

goods. 146

In most

circumstances, gray market goods are legitimately trademarked
genuine goods bought in nation A and transported for sale to
nation B without the consent of the trademark owner in nation
B. 14 7
For example, large U.S. merchandisers frequently buy
consumer goods in Asia and import them for resale in their
domestic stores without the permission of the trademark's U.S.
owner. This generally creates price competition with limited or
exclusive dealerships in the United States supported by the U.S.

142.
Id. at 273-75; EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PRocEss 65-73 (4th ed. 1991) and sources cited
therein.
143.
See J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners In an Integrated
World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 210-15 (1993)
(noting that some developing countries have substantial counterfeiting
industries).
144. Id. (noting traditional suspicions about trademark law).
145. The success of "Malpo Valley" Chilean wines is a good example. The
TRIPS Agreement assures that the value of this indication remains with Chilean
producers.
146. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 6 ("[Nothing in this Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."): Id.
art. 51 n.13 ("It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply such
procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with
the consent of the right holder.... ."); see also Bronckers. supra note 1, at 1265.
147. See generally, James E. Inman, Gray Marketing of Imported
Trademarked Goods: Tarff and Trademark Issues, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 59 (1993);
Richard M. Andrade, Comment, The ParallelImportation of Unauthorized Genuine
Goods: Analysis and Observations of the Gray Market, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
409 (1993); Brian W. Peterman, Note, The Gray Market Solution: An Allocation of
Economic Rights. 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159 (1993); Steven M. Auvil, Gray Market
Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S. Trademark Owner: Should the
LanhamAct Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437 (1995).
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trademark owner. In the United States, the legality of such
imports depends on the nature of the relationship between the
14 8

domestic trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer.

Although the extent to which a gray market should be fostered is
debated in many nations, 14 9 the negotiators of the GATT Uruguay

Round should have been able to find common ground regarding
genuine gray market goods. 150

Within any particular nation, one can understand why a
debate over the legitimacy of gray market goods may rage. In the
United States, for example, consumers benefit from the downward
pressure on prices caused by an active gray market. 15 1 Some
individuals worry, however, that U.S. corporate trademark
owners, and therefore their employees and stockholders, will
suffer when they are unable to control the local availability and
prices of goods manufactured for them overseas. I5 2 Within a

See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). In the EC,
148.
genuine gray market goods may be imported as long as they were initially sold
with the consent of the owner. See Bronckers, supra note 1, at 1265-66.
See Bronckers, supra note 1, at 1265-69.
149.
150. The author's argument in favor of gray market goods does not
encompass those goods that are not identical to those sold with permission of the
local trademark owners. Depending on the country of manufacture or intended
sale, goods sometimes have different ingredients or formulas. When these goods
find their way outside their intended market, a potential for confusion exists.
Consumers may need protection from legitimately trademarked products that
have the potential to cause confusion. See, e.g., Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak
Trading, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1545-47 (D. N.J. 1991) (Imported "Tic Tacs"
contained more calories than U.S. "Tic Tacs". causing confusion actionable under
the Lanham Act.).
151. See Inman, supra note 147, at 110 ("Consumer prices are reduced by
vigorous international price competition provided by importers of diverted
goods."); Andrade. supra note 147, at 435.
Some individuals also worry that importers will "free ride" on
152.
advertising conducted by the local trademark owner. This argument, however.
goes too far. Virtually all sellers benefit from the tastes created by the advertising
of their competitors. When Chyrsler's advertising convinced U.S. car buyers that
the mini-van was a superior product, Ford and Chevrolet quickly took advantage

of the new market created by Chrysler's advertising and marketed their own
competing versions of the same product. Free riding is a time-honored, and
probably efficient, business activity. See generally Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). In response to Nabisco's complaint that Kellogg was
benefiting from its massive advertising expenditures, Justice Brandeis stated:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article
known as "Shredded Wheat"; and thus is sharing in a market which was
created by the skill and judgment of plaintiffs predecessor and has been
widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising persistently made.
But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.
Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
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nation, the empirical question of whether wealth is increased or
decreased by the gray market may be difficult to answer. 15 3 From
a global perspective, however, a strong argument can be made
that the free movement of legitimately trademarked goods is
supported by GATT principles. 15 4 The philosophy of the GATT is
premised on the notion that global wealth and prosperity is tied to
the free movement of goods. Tariffs, the quintessential
impediment to free trade, are suspect because they slow the flow
of goods and generally result in diminished competition, higher
prices, and lower quality goods. Particular tariffs may benefit a
particular country but, in theory, the global community as a
whole is better off without them.
A legal rule that prohibits the importation of legitimately
trademarked goods looks much like a tariff; it creates a barrier at
the border that certain sorts of goods cannot cross. Given the
nature of gray market goods, the barrier is difficult to justify. By
definition, the goods are not counterfeit; the trademarks they bear
are affixed with the authorization of the trademark owner. If for
some reason the goods are defective, noxious, dangerous, or likely
to cause confusion in the market, a ban on importation is easy to
justify.' 5 5

The vast majority of such goods, however, pose no

threat to consumers. Gray market Nikon cameras sold by New
York City mail order houses are real Nikons, identical to Nikons
sold by authorized Nikon dealerships. No consumer protection
rationale can justify a ban on these sorts of legitimately
15 6
trademarked goods.
One can understand why Nikon management, employees,
and stockholders might be upset by the price competition created
by New York mail order houses, but they are hard-pressed to offer
a rationale for banning imports that is consistent with GATT
principles. Their essential claim is that they will lose profits if the
government does not stop certain goods at the border. That may
be true, but General Motors and Ford can make exactly the same
claim: "We will lose profits if the government does not stop
Hondas at the border, or impose a high tariff on Hondas."
Protecting the profit margin of certain producers by stopping
goods at the border is precisely the sort of activity that the GATT
was meant to discourage.
One can only hope that future

153.
See Inman, supra note 147, at 110-16; Andrade, supra note 147, at
427-32; Petersman, supra note 147, at 171-76.
154.
See Inman, supra note 147, at 110 ("[E]recting 'gray market' import
bans" is "inconsistent" with treaties like GATT, which "seek to reduce tariffs and
other barriers to international trade.").
155.
Cf. Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading. Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240
(D.N.J. 1991).
156.
See discussion, supra note 152.
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negotiations will consider mandating the free movement of all
legitimately trademarked goods.
2. Absence of Use Requirements
One other disappointing aspect of the TRIPS Agreement, and
one that is unlikely to be changed, is the movement toward
registration of trademarks without use. Although a member state
is not required to permit registration of trademarks that have
never been, and may never be, used in commerce, neither is it
required to make use a prerequisite for registration. 15 7 The

economic rationale for requiring use before registration is quite
compelling. Without a use requirement, an incentive exists for
entrepreneurs to register large numbers of trademarks and
license them to others. 15 8 As Landes and Posner note, "[T]he
'banking' of trademarks in countries such as Japan that have a
pure registration system does occur and has made it more costly
to enter markets in those countries."' 5 9 As noted above, GATT is
supposed to make the penetration of new goods into markets
easier, not more difficult. Furthermore, basing the property right
on use is consistent with the underlying social function of
trademarks-identifying and distinguishing goods. When a good
is not available for sale, the trademark cannot confer a benefit.
"Thus, conditioning trademark rights on use is a way of limiting
the use of scarce enforcement resources to situations in which
60
the rights in question are likely to yield net social benefits."'
Requiring use before registration would probably generate an
efficiency gain that would benefit international markets.

157. See TRIPS, supra note 2. art 15(3).
158. A firm allowed to register trademarks without using them might
invest substantial resources in thinking up plausible new brand
names.... ITIhe ownership of a vast number of them, and the aggregate
licensing revenues that such ownership would command, would be a
magnet drawing resources into the activity of creating brand names,

probably beyond the optimal level of such investment.
Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 281.
Id.
159.
160. Id. at 282. Landes and Posner note, however, that:

The solution is not Ideal; it could lead to the premature development and
marketing of goods by a firm eager to establish a right In a nifty
trademark. But if the elasticity of supply of brand names is as high as we
believe, very few individual trademarks will be so valuable apart from the
products that they name that a firm will distort its marketing decisions in
order to appropriate a particular name.
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III. CONCLUSION

The TRIPS Agreement is a significant improvement over prior
ineffectual regimes governing the international protection of
intellectual property. Although TRIPS' sections on geographical
indications create uncertainty and TRIPS fails to endorse gray
market goods or to require that trademark registration be
predicated on actual use in commerce, the Agreement mandates
high substantive standards and effective enforcement that should
foster both the development and movement of goods and
technology. Although U.S. trademark law is still not quite in
16 1
compliance with all of the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement,

its deviations from the mandated standards are relatively
unimportant. The fact that Congress felt it had to make only two
minor amendments to the Lanham Act indicates the great extent
to which the TRIPS Agreement mirrors U.S. federal law. As a
result, in the next ten years, 16 2 U.S. trademark owners doing
business overseas will be encountering legal systems that look
more and more like their own.

161. See supra notes 112-39 and accompanying text.
162. See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 66 (least developed country members
have up to ten years to comply with substantive TRIPS standards).

